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						 Clark (1887) emphasized on the role of latent competition and questioned the effectiveness of it as compared to actual competition in restraining monopoly pricing.  More recently the theory of contestable markets formalized the effects of potential entry.  Baumol (1982) formalised the 
idea of contestability. 
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						 Baumol, Panzar, and Willig (1982) characterized a contestable market as 
one in which there is
  
  -  atleast one potential rival with the same cost structure,
  
 -  potential entrants evaluate the profitability of entry at the 
       incumbent firm's prices, and 
  
 -  there are no barriers to entry and exit and in particular there 
       is a possibility of hit-and-run entry.
  
The fundamental result is that in contestable markets the incumbent monopolist charges the average cost price in equilibrium.
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						 Coursey, Isaac, and Smith (1984) conducted an experiment to designed to 
evaluate the effects of contestability under decreasing cost conditions with human buyers. In the contested experimental markets, four of the 
duopolies yielded competitive price outcomes, and the other two exhibited downward trends in prices.Harrison and Mckee(1985) and Harrison, Mckee, 
and Rutstrom (1989) observed similar results in their experiments with 
simulated buyers. 
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						 A key behavioral assumption of the contestable markets theory is that 
the entrant evaluate the profitability of entry given the incumbent's 
current prices.  Harrison (1986) conducted an experiment in which this 
restriction was built in.  In his experimental institution the incumbent 
had to post a price first, which the entrant could observe before 
choosing a price.  Harrison again found contestability hypothesis to 
generate the predicted monopoly restraining effects in his experiment. 
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						 Milner, Pratt, and Reily (1990) implemented another environment where at 
any instant the seller with the lowest price makes the sale. This flow 
market experiment involved decreasing costs up to capacity, and simulated 
continuous time buyers. The authors did not observe any stable pricing 
behavior though. When the price fell too low one seller often exited at 
which the other seller raised the prices dramatically.
 
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-  Clark, John Bates (1887). The Limits of Competition. Political 
     Science Quarterly 2: 45-61.
 -  Coursey, D., M. Isaac, and V. Smith (1984): Natural Monopoly and 
     Contested Markets: Some Experimental Results. Journal of Law and 
     Economics 27: 91-113.
 -  Harrison, Glenn W. (1986). Experimental evaluation of the 
     contestable markets hypothesis. Public Regulation, E. Bailey, 
     editor, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
 -  Millner, Edward L., Pratt, Michael D., Reilly, Robert J (1990). 
     Contestability in real time experimental flow markets. Rand Journal 
     of Economics 21: 584-99.
					
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