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Cataloged Resource Summary

 

Title

Principal/Agent Game

Author

Charles Holt

Categories

Information and Uncertainty
Game Theory
Welfare Economics: Allocative Efficiency, Externalities, Fairness, Altruism
Labor and Demographic Economics
Law and Economics

Type

Experiment Software

Description

This program runs a set of "Principal/Agent" games. The first mover (employer) makes a contract offer, and the second movers (worker) chooses whether to accept the contract. A worker who accepts a contract then chooses an effort level, which is costly to the worker but which benefits the employer. The possible contracts include fixed wage payments, along with possible ex post bonuses, monitoring, penalties, and/or profit sharing. If the contract only specifies a required fixed wage and an optional bonus, then the Nash equilibrium for selfish preferences in a one-shot game is to offer the minimum possible effort, since the wage is paid irrespective of effort. Efforts may be higher with fixed matchings or if participants are concerned with fairness and reciprocity. A number of contract options based (based on penalties and rewards) are also available. The game highlights issues of contract incentives, reciprocity, and strategy.

URL

http://veconlab.econ.virginia.edu/pa/pa.php

Home URL

http://veconlab.econ.virginia.edu/
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