Collapse Sidebar

Students / Subjects


Experimenters
Email:

Password:


Forgot password?

Register

Cataloged Resource Summary

 

Title

Game Theory Course: 5.2 Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting

Author

Jim Ratliff

Category

Game Theory

Subject

Repeated Games

Type

Article

Description

Infinite repetitions of the stage game potentially pose a problem: a player's repeated-game payoff may be infinite. We ensure the finiteness of the repeated-game payoffs by introducing discounting of future payoffs relative to earlier payoffs. Such discounting can be an expression of time preference and/or uncertainty about the length of the game. We introduce the average discounted payoff as a convenience which normalizes the repeated-game payoffs to be "on the same scale" as the stage-game payoffs.

URL

http://www.virtualperfection.com/gametheory/Section5.2.html

Home URL

http://www.virtualperfection.com/gametheory/index.html
Copyright 2006 Experimental Economics Center. All rights reserved. Send us feedback