Title |
Game Theory Course: 6.2 Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of Sender-Receiver (Signalling) Games
|
Author |
Jim Ratliff |
|
Category
|
Game Theory
|
Subject |
Bayesian Games |
Type |
Article |
Description |
We consider here the simplest dynamic games of incomplete information: sender-receiver games. There are only two players: a Sender (S) and a Receiver (R). The Sender's action will be to send a message, m, chosen from a message space M to the Receiver. The Receiver will observe this message m and respond to it by choosing an action a from his action space A. |
URL |
http://www.virtualperfection.com/gametheory/Section6.2.html |
Home URL |
http://www.virtualperfection.com/gametheory/index.html |
