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Cataloged Resource Summary

 

Title

Game Theory Course: 6.2 Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of Sender-Receiver (Signalling) Games

Author

Jim Ratliff

Category

Game Theory

Subject

Bayesian Games

Type

Article

Description

We consider here the simplest dynamic games of incomplete information: sender-receiver games. There are only two players: a Sender (S) and a Receiver (R). The Sender's action will be to send a message, m, chosen from a message space M to the Receiver. The Receiver will observe this message m and respond to it by choosing an action a from his action space A.

URL

http://www.virtualperfection.com/gametheory/Section6.2.html

Home URL

http://www.virtualperfection.com/gametheory/index.html
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