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Cataloged Resource Summary

 

Title

Game Theory Course: 6.3 Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games

Author

Jim Ratliff

Category

Game Theory

Subject

Bayesian Games

Type

Article

Description

The concept of Perfect Bayesian equilibrium for extensive-form games is defined by four Bayes Requirements. These requirements eliminate the bad subgame-perfect equilibria by requiring players to have beliefs, at each information set, about which node of the information set she has reached, conditional on being informed she is in that information set.

URL

http://www.virtualperfection.com/gametheory/Section6.3.html

Home URL

http://www.virtualperfection.com/gametheory/index.html
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