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Experiment Configuration

Selten and Stoecker Prisoner's Dilemma

Summary: This configuration is based on the Selten and Stoecker(1986) experiments. In each supergame the game shown below is repeated ten times. Each subject plays 25 supergames. Each subject faces the same opponent within a supergame, and is rematched for each new supergame.

Reference: Selten, Reinhard and Stoecker (1986)?End Behaviour in Sequences of Finite Prisoner?s Dilemma Supergames? A Learning Theory Approach,? Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organisation, 7, 47-70

Further Reading: Handbook discussion on Prisoner's Dilemma experiments

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